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A B S T R A C T   
Unhealthy diets are increasing contributors to poor health and mortality in low- and middle-income countries 
(LMICs). Government interventions targeting the structural drivers of unhealthy diets are needed to prevent 
these illnesses, including nutrition labelling regulations that create healthier food environments. Yet, imple-
mentation remains slow and uneven. One explanation for slow implementation highlights the role of politics, 
including powerful ideological discourse and its strategic deployment by economically powerful actors. In this 
article, we advance research on the politics of nutrition policies by analysing political discourse on nutrition 
labelling regulations within an influential and under-studied global institution: the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). We identified WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee meeting minutes with reference to 
nutrition labelling policies proposed by Thailand, Chile, Indonesia, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Uruguay 
(2007–2019; n = 47). We analysed the frames, narratives, and normative claims that feature in inter-country 
discourse within TBT meetings and examined how actors mobilize ideological and material sources of power 
via these statements. We find that informal government challenges to nutrition labelling proposals within the 
Committee featured a narrative that individualized the causes of and solutions to poor diet, downplayed harms 
from industrialised food products, and framed state regulation as harmful and unjust. These non-technical claims 
mobilised neoliberal ideology and rhetoric to contest the normative legitimacy of members’ proposals and to de- 
socialize and de-politicize poor diets. Furthermore, high-income countries (HICs) re-framed policy goals to focus 
on individual determinants of poor nutrition whilst calling for their preferred policies to be adopted. Patterns of 
discourse within TBT meetings also had striking similarities with arguments raised by multi-national food cor-
porations elsewhere. Our findings suggest that non-technical and ideological arguments raised during TBT 
meetings serve as inconspicuous tools through which nutrition labelling policies in LMICs are undermined by 
HICs, industry, and the powerful ideology of neoliberalism.   
1. Introduction 
Poor diet and malnutrition are major contributors to the global 
burden of disease (Lim et al., 2012). In 2017, 10–12 million deaths were 
attributable to dietary risk factors, including excess salt, sugar, and 
trans-fat consumption (Afshin et al., 2019). The human suffering caused 
by these illnesses is especially acute in low- and middle-income coun-
tries (LMICs) where high under-nutrition co-exists with rising rates of 
over-nutrition, obesity, and related non-communicable diseases (NCDs) 
(Perez-Escamilla et al., 2018). These illnesses are also expensive to treat 
and, just as poverty can increase the risk of poor nutrition, paying for 
treatments pushes millions of households into poverty annually (Jan 
et al., 2018; Mahal et al. 2010). 
Yet, the scale of the challenges to global health and prosperity 
wrought by diet-related illnesses is not in any sense inevitable, as a suite 
of measures can be effective in preventing them (WHO 2017). Many 
require a strong role for government via laws and regulations targeting 
the structural drivers of poor nutrition, including unhealthy food envi-
ronments characterized by an abundance of cheap, unhealthy foods 
(Swinburn et al., 2011). There is growing international recognition of 
the need to implement such measures (UN 2018). However, government 
action to date remains slow, inadequate, and uneven, especially in 
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LMICs (WHO 2020). Indeed, nutrition scholars often observe that 
implementing structural interventions to address unhealthy food envi-
ronments is fraught with political challenges (Baker et al., 2018). Thus, 
scholars are turning increasing attention to the political processes and 
power dynamics that shape nutrition policy implementation. For 
example, scholars have identified how government action to address 
nutritional diseases is undermined by appeals to a neoliberal rhetoric via 
demands for individual freedom, personal responsibility for health, and 
minimal regulation to sustain economic competitiveness (Baker et al., 
2017; Chaufan and Saliba 2019; Henderson et al., 2009). 
What much of this research recognizes is that the frames, narratives, 
and ideological appeals that feature in political discourse can have a 
strong impact on whether and how government intervenes (Avni et al. 
2015). These discursive influences on policy are typically less percep-
tible than other factors, such as evidence concerning the benefits or costs 
of a policy, but inconspicuousness belies inconsequence. Experimental 
studies have consistently demonstrated ‘framing effects’ on political 
attitudes and priorities, as when people reject a policy proposal when 
presented with its negative effects (e.g. regulation leads to a 5% rise in 
unemployment) and favour it when presented with equivalent positive 
effects (e.g. regulation sustains 95% employment) (Chong and Druck-
man 2007). Research also shows that arguments invoking normative and 
ideological appeals can be highly persuasive (Feinberg and Willer 2015; 
Kidwell et al. 2013). These discursive appeals therefore rank among the 
most influential tools that actors can leverage to shape policy decisions 
and agendas (Schmidt 2010). To understand the political processes and 
power dynamics shaping nutrition policy, it is therefore necessary to 
assess how interventions are described and contested in different fora, 
and how different sources of power are mobilised in these discussions. 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is arguably one of the most 
important, under-studied forums in which diverse policies, including 
nutrition regulations, have been discussed in recent decades (Barlow 
et al., 2018; Thow et al., 2017). The WTO is an intergovernmental or-
ganization that co-ordinates the rules of trade between its 164 members 
(WTO 2020). Besides reducing trade taxes (‘tariffs’), WTO members 
agree to follow rules related to non-tariff measures (which include 
‘technical barriers to trade’). This is because trade costs can be created 
by regulatory differences between states, such as government regula-
tions designed to create healthy food environments. For example, WHO 
recommends nutrition labelling of packaged foods (WHO 2013). This 
provides at-a-glance nutritional information about a food at the point of 
sale (Jones et al., 2019). However, nutrition labelling can create 
non-tariff trade costs if producers have to comply with different re-
quirements in different jurisdictions (Thow et al., 2017). Nutrition 
labelling therefore falls under the remit of the WTO Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade, the ‘TBT Agreement’ (WTO 2015). 
Scholars investigating the links between trade policy and health have 
long noted that WTO members could refer to TBT rules at regular 
meetings of the TBT Committee to contest another member’s nutrition 
policies (Friel et al. 2015). During these meetings, governments can raise 
what are called ‘informal challenges’ to policies by claiming that they 
violate TBT rules, known formally as ‘Specific Trade Concerns’ (STC) 
(Wijkstrom and McDaniels 2013; WTO 2015). These informal challenges 
can stoke fears of a politically and economically costly ‘formal dispute’ 
to follow if members do not change policies. This can, in turn, lead to 
changes in policy design, delays in implementation, or the abandonment 
of a policy together (Koivusalo et al. 2009). One empirical study of 
nutrition labelling debates at the TBT Committee by Thow et al. (2017) 
found that high-income WTO members invoked TBT rules to contest 
novel nutrition labelling initiatives proposed by Thailand, Chile, 
Indonesia, Peru and Ecuador between 2007 and 2015. Barlow et al. 
further showed that several of these informal challenges were followed 
by changes in policy design and delayed implementation (Barlow et al., 
2018). 
Previous analyses have demonstrated the significant potential for 
TBT discussions to shape policy. They also provided important insights 
into the ways in which technical obligations within TBT rules are 
invoked to informally challenge and ultimately delay or alter policies 
targeting the structural drivers of poor nutrition. Yet, we know relatively 
little about the frames, narratives, and normative appeals that feature in 
TBT discussions on nutrition policy, including nutrition labelling, and 
how power is mobilised through these non-technical claims. Analyses of 
government discourse within WTO pertaining to another important area 
of health policy, tobacco control, has nevertheless revealed important 
insights. For example, Drope and Lencucha (2014) illustrated how 
progress to overcome the tensions between trade and tobacco control 
has been advanced, in part, due to the emergence of global discourse 
seeking to integrate the two norms more coherently at WTO (Drope and 
Lencucha 2014). Lencucha et al. similarly observed that government 
officials raised a suite of non-technical claims to contest tobacco control 
policies at WTO, including at the TBT Committee (Lencucha et al. 2016). 
Furthermore, scholarship on trade and health outside WTO has identi-
fied how discursive processes and power asymmetries can shape the 
outcome of trade policy discussions that have implications for health 
(Friel et al., 2016; Schram 2018; Townsend et al. 2019, 2020). 
In this article, we analyse the discourse used to informally challenge 
nutrition labelling regulations proposed by Thailand, Chile, Indonesia, 
Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Uruguay at the WTO TBT Committee, 
2007–2019. ‘Discourse’ here refers to the frames, narratives, and 
normative appeals that are articulated in interactive communications, 
and the underlying ideologies, public philosophies and values they 
represent (Van Dijk 1993; Schmidt 2010). In our analysis we therefore 
characterize the frames, narratives, and normative appeals portrayed in 
TBT minutes. We further assess how ideological and material sources of 
power are mobilised through these patterns of discourse. By doing so, 
our study advances scholars’ and policy-makers’ understanding of the 
political processes and power dynamics surrounding a government 
policy to address nutritional diseases, via a structural intervention, 
within an influential institution in which almost every country globally 
now participates. At the same time, we advance research on trade and 
health by calling attention to the non-technical pathways through which 
nutrition policy can be influenced in trade fora. 
2. Materials and methods 
2.1. Study setting and scope 
We analysed written minutes of TBT Committee meetings where 
WTO members raised informal challenges to other members’ nutrition 
labelling regulation proposals. TBT Committee discussions usually take 
place two or three times a year in Geneva, Switzerland, and are designed 
to serve as a forum for WTO members to request further information 
about other members’ regulations and raise informal ichallenges. Dis-
agreements that are not resolved via TBT discussions can escalate to a 
formal dispute but, in practice. most informal challenges do not escalate 
further as a majority of disagreements is resolved via TBT discussions 
(WTO 2015). 
Our analysis focusses on TBT discussions about WTO members’ 
interpretative front-of-pack (FOP) nutrition labelling proposals. FOP 
nutrition labels provide information about a product’s nutritional 
quality on the primary display panel of its package (Jones et al., 2019). 
‘Interpretative’ measures include simplified nutrient profile in-
terpretations that help individuals understand the healthfulness or 
unhealthfulness of a product at the point of purchase, for example by 
using subjective words (eg, ‘good’ or ‘bad’) and ‘traffic light’ labels with 
a green-amber-red colour scheme. 
We focussed on debates about interpretative FOP nutrition labelling 
regulations for two reasons. First, a growing body of evidence suggests 
that these measures can be effective in creating healthier food envi-
ronments by providing information at the point of purchase to enable 
healthier consumption, and by encouraging food manufacturers to 
improve the nutrient profile of packaged foods (Shangguan et al., 2019). 
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Interpretative FOP nutrition labelling is therefore frequently described 
as an effective means to help build environments that support healthy 
diets (WHO, 2017). Second, only a small number of countries have 
implemented interpretative FOP measures to date (WHO 2020). Our 
focus specifically on these measures therefore reflects our interest in the 
political processes surrounding nutrition interventions that are pur-
ported to be effective in promoting healthy food environments but 
remain sparsely implemented. 
2.2. Methodology and analytical framework 
Our analysis used a methodology based on critical discourse analysis 
(CDA), which has been widely adapted to social scientific studies of 
health policy (Avni et al. 2015; Chaufan and Saliba 2019). CDA refers to 
an approach that “explores often opaque relationships between discur-
sive practices, events and texts and wider social and cultural structures, 
relations and processes … and [how] these arise out of and are ideo-
logically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power” 
(Fairclough, 2001, p. 91). We explore these relationships by combining a 
thematic analysis of the content of TBT discussions with consideration of 
the power sources and relations in WTO members’ arguments. This was 
guided by research concerning the nature and influence of discourse in 
political debates and its relation to different sources of power. Table 1 
summarizes the key concepts that we drew on to inform this analysis. 
Note that we do not undertake a deductive test of a framework and its 
applicability. Instead, we use an ‘integrated’ approach (Bradley et al. 
2007). This approach combines inductive code development with a 
framework of terms and concepts to inform data organization and 
interpretation. We also recognize our positionality, that is, that our 
knowledge and background play a key role in framing our research 
questions, selecting and coding the data, and giving meaning to our 
results (G. Rose 1997). Hence, below we describe in detail the theoret-
ical and empirical background of our study, our analytical focus, and 
how we integrated this into our analysis. 
The starting point for our analysis is the observation, grounded in a 
constructivist perspective, that political agents seldom legitimate their 
claims by referring only to formal rules ‘on the books’ or economic cost/ 
benefit analyses (Smith and Shiffman 2016). Such claims are typically 
accompanied by appeals to a ‘logic of appropriateness’, that is, what is 
socially defined as normal, true, right, or good (March and Olsen, 2004). 
For example, Van Leeuwen identified several common legitimation 
strategies in addition to appeals to formal rules, including ‘moral eval-
uation’ via reference to value systems, and ‘authorization’ via reference 
to powerful figures or tradition (Van Leeuwen 2007). These discursive 
devices often serve to make an argument based on formal rules 
persuasive (Carstensen and Schmidt 2016). 
Socially constructed frames, rhetorical narratives, norms, values, and 
beliefs, or ‘ideational’ claims, form the substantive content of this 
discourse (Schmidt 2010). Framing, for example, involves selecting 
some aspects of perceived reality and making them more salient so as to 
(re)construct or (re)define the issues and problems that enter the policy 
agenda, a policy goal, and the need or reason for reform (Béland 2009; 
Entman 1993). Rhetorical narratives give meaning to these frames by 
binding them through inter-linked events, institutions, protagonists 
(Atkinson 2000; Stone 1989). 
In this article, we sought to shed light on the politics of nutrition 
policy implementation by establishing how discourse is used in attempts 
to shape or subvert nutrition labelling policies at the WTO, and how 
different sources of power are mobilised in this process. To this end, our 
analysis first sought to identify the ideational claims that are deployed in 
TBT discourse. On the one hand, this constitutes an attempt to wield 
power by attempting to influence policies and political processes 
through discursive practices (Fuchs and Kalfagianni 2009). On the other 
hand, discourse can be particularly influential when it is bolstered by 
other sources of power (Carstensen and Schmidt 2016). This includes 
material advantages, which confer actors with the resources and au-
thority needed to effectively shape political agendas and decisions; 
organizational capacities, for example access to policy networks and 
lobbying platforms; and ideological sources, derived from referencing 
dominant ideas, frames, narratives, and values to effectively exert po-
litical pressure (Carstensen and Schmidt 2016; Harris, 2020; Shiffman 
and Smith 2007). Hence, the next task of our analysis was to identify 
how different sources of power are mobilised via discourse. We con-
ducted a preliminary review of WTO discourse considering these sources 
of power and others identified in the studies cited above. We then 
focussed our analysis on the two sources we primarily observed in our 
data: ideological and material. 
We first assessed the powerful ideologies that members draw on 
when legitimating their arguments, with specific attention to what is 
arguably the most potent ideology in debates about both trade and 
health policy in the post-war era: neoliberalism (Rushton and Williams 
2012; Townsend et al., 2020). ‘Neoliberalism’ has varying definitions 
and here it refers to the belief that human well-being can and should be 
advanced within an institutional framework that upholds individual 
liberty, protects private property rights, and sustains the ‘self--
regulating’ capacity of market mechanisms to allocate resources effi-
ciently and address social problems (Harvey 2007; Thorsen 2010). These 
beliefs manifest in arguments that invoke such beliefs and construct 
individuals as subjects who rationally deliberate about alternative 
choices, assigns personal responsibility to these decisions, and warns of 
the dangers and inefficiencies of state intervention (Brown 2003; N. 
Rose and Miller 1992). In the context of health, for example, neoliberal 
discourse champions the role of “self-regulating, individualized prac-
tices” over political and social determinants (Ayo 2012, 102). This 
serves to de-socialize poor health, as social determinants are overlooked 
and downplayed, and to de-politicize illness, as it becomes a personal 
issue which individuals, rather than governments, are to address (Carter 
2015; Sweet 2018). 
Arguments rooted in neoliberal beliefs can be highly persuasive 
Table 1 
Key concepts used to guide coding and interpretation.  
Term or concept Description 
Constructivism An approach to political analysis that recognizes that political 
agents debating health and social policies regularly justify their 
position by appeals to a ‘logic of appropriateness’, that is, what 
is socially defined as normal, true, right, or good. 
Frame The (re)construction or (re)definition of the issues and problems 
that enter the policy agenda, a policy goal, and the need or 
reason for reform. 
Narrative An account linking events, causes, actors, and institutions in 
ways that are contingent on one another, within a structural 
arch, to build a story. 
Discourse Written or spoken communications that convey ways of 
understanding and conceptualizing the world. Ideas, frames, 
narratives, causal stories, values, and beliefs form the 
substantive content of discourse. 
Ideology Socially shared values, ideas, and beliefs that circulate via 
discourse and are used to justify a particular political tradition 
or policy. Dominant ideologies are pervasive and often 
uncontested, what Gaventa calls ‘invisible power’. 
Neoliberalism A contested and varyingly defined term. For our purposes, 
neoliberalism refers to the belief that human well-being can and 
should be advanced within an institutional framework that 
upholds individual liberty, protects private property rights, 
frees markets from state intervention, and sustains the ‘self- 




Sources of effective influence on policy that actors mobilize to 
exert pressure, including ideological sources (eg mobilizing 
powerful dominant ideologies to legitimize an argument) and 
material sources (eg leveraging the resources, status, and 
authority associated with being wealthy to pressure for changes 
in policy designs or agendas). 
Notes: See text for full Discussion of how we draw on these concepts in our 
coding and analysis. 
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because they appeal to shared ideas about how the economy works or 
should work to maximise output and efficiency (Rushton and Williams 
2012). Implicitly referencing neoliberal theory and beliefs therefore 
constitutes a powerful argumentation resource, or source of power, that 
bolsters the perceived legitimacy of a narrative, argument, or frame, and 
its efficacy in yielding influence (Béland 2009; Finlayson 2013). Refer-
ences to neoliberal beliefs may also be particularly potent within the 
WTO, as WTO members may see the institution and its rules as being 
oriented towards a neoliberal goal of global market openness (Wijk-
strom and McDaniels 2013). Hence, such references may be seen to 
reflect and uphold the core tenets of the WTO and TBT rules. 
Second, it is well-recognised that powerful actors leverage the 
influential potential of discourse in order to strategically advance their 
interests (Fuchs and Kalfagianni 2009; Rushton and Williams 2012). 
There are, however, uncertainties regarding the precise constellation of 
power asymmetries that characterize informal TBT challenges. On the 
one hand, there are significant disparities in economic resources and 
power between HIC and LMIC members within the WTO, and some 
scholars regard WTO Agreements as diplomatic instruments that are 
used by powerful HIC governments to wield political pressure (McGrady 
2011). On the other hand, LMICs may also use the TBT Committee to 
contest policies elsewhere. This can happen in part because powerful 
international businesses lobby LMIC governments to raise informal 
challenges against health regulations on their behalf (Eckhardt et al. 
2016). As such, LMICs may frequently raise informal challenges against 
other LMICs. We therefore assessed whether there were any distinctive 
non-technical arguments evident in the discourse with respect to the 
income level of member states. We further plotted the income pattern in 
informal challenges and later return to the possibility that powerful 
businesses may behind LMIC challenges when reviewing our main 
findings in the Discussion. 
2.3. Data sources, coding, and analysis 
Fig. 1 summarizes how we identified relevant TBT discussions and 
corresponding documentation. Briefly, we combined data from Barlow 
et al. with additional TBT Committee meeting minutes, written chal-
lenges, and policy proposal summaries from WTO Documents Online 
(Barlow et al., 2018; WTO 2020). After reviewing these documents we 
identified discussions on all interpretative FOP nutrition labelling 
measures that were subject to informal challenges at the TBT Commit-
tee, 1995–2019. We identified relevant information in n = 47 docu-
ments pertaining to discussions on 7 countries’ proposals: Thailand, 
Chile, Indonesia, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Uruguay. Table 2 sum-
marizes the nutrition labelling regulations we identified, the year they 
were proposed, and the documents we analysed. 
Our analysis of informal TBT challenges proceeded in three steps: 
coding, code categorisation, and power analysis (Fairclough 2003). The 
final coding scheme, data, and replication files are available in Appen-
dices 1-3. We first coded the non-technical claims raised in TBT debates 
about nutrition labelling policies to identify their principal discursive 
elements. These ‘non-technical’ arguments i) did not refer to the TBT 
Agreement, ii) did not refer to a specific TBT clause or quote text from 
the TBT Agreement, and/or iii) did not address technical challenges to 
nutrition labelling policies, namely those discussed in Thow and col-
leagues’ analysis (Thow et al., 2017). In addition, identification of 
non-technical claims was aided by the analytical concepts in Table 2. 
Note that our data coding included statements that surrounded refer-
ences to TBT rules. In the Results we note any instances where such 
statements may infer references to the TBT Agreement but are beyond its 
scope. 
We used an iterative procedure to code TBT discussions (Miles et al. 
2013). The first researcher selected a sample of the minutes, summa-
rized the arguments, and developed a preliminary codebook with 
reference to the analytical framework, where each code represented a 
distinct non-technical statement. Both researchers then refined the 
codebook together, with reference to the sampled data and the analyt-
ical framework. The first researcher then coded the remainder of the 
data whilst regularly comparing the draft codebook to the new data to 
assess the suitability of existing codes. We expanded, combined, or 
updated the codebook and re-coded previous sections of the data where 
necessary, and resolved any ambiguities via discussion. 
Next, we grouped codes according to categories reflecting a common 
underlying narrative or discursive strategy, informed by the analytical 
framework described above. We then scrutinized the relation between 
discursive categories and ideological sources of power, i.e. invoking 
neoliberal ideology, and material sources of power, i.e. country-income 
levels. We compared discursive themes and categories to the specific 
neoliberal assumptions, values and beliefs discussed above to assess how 
members implicitly referenced them in their arguments. We grouped 
discursive categories and themes by country income level using the 
World Bank’s income classification scheme to identify any distinctive 
claims raised by high-income members (World Bank 2018). Coding and 
code grouping was supported by NVivo12 Plus qualitative analysis 
software and network plots were created using R. 
3. Results 
Fig. 2 plots each informal challenge as a network figure. Fig. 2 shows 
that opponents of nutrition labelling policies at the TBT Committee 
included HIC members, including the USA, the EU, and Canada. Several 
LMICs also raised informal challenges, including Guatemala, Brazil, 
Costa Rica, and Mexico. 
Table 3 summarizes the principal discursive themes and categories 
we identified in WTO member statements and their relationship to 
ideological and material sources of power (Appendix 4 for themes by 
income level). Below we outline each of these discursive patterns and 
their relation to neoliberal discourse and country-income level in further 
detail. 
Fig. 1. Policy and documentation identification procedures. Notes: See Table 2 
for full list of labelling policies and WTO documents included in the analysis. 
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3.1. Neoliberal narratives: individualizing the causes of poor nutrition 
WTO members contested the decision to implement nutrition label-
ling policies and features of their design by advancing a neoliberal 
narrative that championed individual determinants of poor nutrition 
whilst downplaying the role of food products and the unhealthy nutrient 
profile of pre-packaged foods. There were five main arguments that were 
used to build this narrative. The arguments were cited alongside and in 
support of technical arguments citing TBT rules, including those 
claiming that the measures created ‘unnecessary’ trade costs and those 
questioning the rationale or legitimacy of the measures, often with 
reference to concerns regarding the evidence base underpinning the 
measure. 
First, members highlighted the role that individuals and their habits 
or lifestyles played in causing dietary illnesses. For example, a Brazilian 
representative commented on Chile’s labelling proposals by stating that 
obesity was caused by “bad lifestyles and habits” (G/TBT/M/62). Sec-
ond, WTO members highlighted the role of an individual’s dietary 
context in determining the links between processed food consumption 
and disease. One instance of this framing occurred when an official from 
the US argued that Peru’s labelling proposals “failed to consider total 
dietary intake or the amount and frequency of a food’s consumption” 
(G/TBT/M/73). A representative from Costa Rica also argued that 
Uruguay’s proposed labelling regulation was misleading and confusing 
because it failed to take account of how “the context of an overall diet is 
what really matters when it comes to informing and educating con-
sumers about nutrients of public health concern” (G/TBT/W/613). 
Third, WTO members downplayed the risks of processed foods and 
ingredients by questioning their harms, whilst implying that individual 
self-regulation or moderation was relatively important. For example, in 
2013 a US official challenged Peru’s proposed labelling regulation by 
arguing it was inappropriate to use messages alerting individuals to 
products ‘high in’ certain nutrients as “any food could be eaten in 
moderation as part of an overall healthy diet” (G/TBT/M/61). Fourth, 
WTO members similarly suggested that labelling proposals mistakenly 
singled out foods as a cause of nutritional diseases. For example, Mex-
ico’s written comments on Chile’s draft legislation stated that using the 
terms ‘bad’ on labels could lead consumers to “assume that non- 
transmissible diseases such as obesity are caused by the consumption 
of specific foods” (G/TBT/W/429). A Guatemalan representative simi-
larly questioned Ecuador’s labelling proposals by arguing that it “prej-
udiced food as the only cause of the problem” (G/TBT/M/66). 
Finally, members emphasized the nutritional benefits of foods that 
had been designated as ‘unhealthy’ according to a nutrition labelling 
scheme. For example, in 2007 a US official informally challenged 
Thailand’s proposed traffic-light labelling scheme by stating that “she 
was concerned that the food on the list would be demonized whereas 
this food could be part of a healthy diet” (G/TBT/M/45). A US official 
also challenged Indonesia’s proposed labelling scheme in 2013 by 
stating that “sugar, sodium and fat … were also necessary components of 
a healthy diet” (G/TBT/M/60). 
3.2. Contesting and affirming congruence with neoliberal economic 
theory, values, and beliefs 
WTO member discussions on nutrition labelling proposals featured 
statements that affirmed or contested the normative legitimacy of 
members’ policies based on their congruence with neoliberal economic 
theory, values, and beliefs. There were three such statements. First, 
WTO members sanctioned what they saw as the broad principles re-
flected in nutrition labelling policies: an individualized approach to 
redressing poor diet by targeting increased consumer information and 
improving choices, lifestyles, and habits. For example, in 2007 an EU 
official expressed support for the Thai government’s goal of “improving 
consumer information on nutritional facts” (G/TBT/M/42). A Costa 
Rican official further commented on Uruguay’s proposals by remarking 
that they “support all training, education and information programmes 
aimed at improving the dietary habits of the population” (G/TBT/M/ 
64). In both instances, these WTO members subsequently critiqued the 
scope and design of the proposed measures. 
Second, WTO members cited the harms, inefficiencies and injustices 
of state intervention. One manifestation of this argument cited the likely 
negative consequences of state intervention for nutrition and health, 
reflecting the neoliberal belief that state intervention is a harmful and 
inefficient approach to achieving social objectives. For example, a Costa 
Rican representative informally challenged Peru’s labelling proposals by 
stating that the measure risked “considerably contributing to the in-
crease in informal supply of food products and beverages that were not 
produced under known health standards” (G/TBT/M/66). Members 
further commented on the injustices of state intervention, reflecting 
neoliberal beliefs that state intervention is malign. In 2013, a US 
representative argued that Indonesia’s proposed regulation would 
Table 2 
Documents included for analysis.  
Country & policy Document IDs Year(s) 
challenged 
Thailand - Labelling 
Requirement for Snack Foods 
G/TBT/N/THA/215, G/TBT/ 
M/41, G/TBT/M/42, G/TBT/ 
M/43, G/TBT/M/44, G/TBT/ 
M/45, G/TBT/M/46 
2007–2008 
Chile - Proposed amendment to 
the Food Health Regulations 
G/TBT/N/CHL/219, G/TBT/ 
N/CHL/221, G/TBT/N/CHL/ 
282, G/TBT/W/361, G/TBT/ 









Indonesia - Ministry of Health 
Regulation on the inclusion 
of sugar, salt and fat content 
information, as well as health 
messages on the label of 
processed foods 
G/TBT/N/IDN/58, G/TBT/ 
W/445, G/TBT/M/60, G/ 
TBT/M/61, G/TBT/M/62, G/ 
TBT/M/63, G/TBT/M/64, G/ 
TBT/M/65, G/TBT/M/66, G/ 
TBT/M/67, G/TBT/M/68, G/ 
TBT/M/69, G/TBT/M/70 
2013–2016 
Peru - Act to Promote Healthy 
Eating Among Children and 
Adolescents 
G/TBT/N/PER/59, G/TBT/ 
W/429, G/TBT/M/60, G/ 
TBT/M/61, G/TBT/M/62, G/ 
TBT/M/63, G/TBT/M/64, G/ 
TBT/M/65, G/TBT/M/66, G/ 
TBT/M/67, G/TBT/M/68, G/ 
TBT/M/69, G/TBT/M/70, G/ 
TBT/M/71, G/TBT/M/72, G/ 
TBT/M/73, G/TBT/M/74 
2013–2018 
Ecuador - Resolution on the 
labelling of processed and 
packaged food products; 
Ministry of Public Health 
Executive Decree amending 
the Sanitary Regulations for 
the Labelling of Processed 
Foods for Human 
Consumption 
G/TBT/N/ECU/19,G/TBT/ 
W/407, G/TBT/W/430 G/ 
TBT/M/62, G/TBT/M/63, G/ 
TBT/M/64, G/TBT/M/65, G/ 
TBT/M/66, G/TBT/M/67, G/ 
TBT/M/68, G/TBT/M/69, G/ 
TBT/M/70, G/TBT/M/71, G/ 
TBT/M/72, G/TBT/M/73, G/ 
TBT/M/74 
2014–2018 









26, G/TBT/W/613, G/TBT/ 
W/614, G/TBT/W/677, G/ 
TBT/M/77, G/TBT/M/78 
2019 
Notes: n = 47 documents including written policy notifications outlining a policy 
(n = 11), TBT meeting minutes (n = 24), and written comments on WTO noti-
fications submitted ahead of TBT meetings (n = 12). Document references 
correspond to WTO nomenclature. All documents are freely available online 
from the WTO Documents Online archive (WTO 2020b). 
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“unfairly position certain foods in the eyes of consumers” (G/TBT/M/ 
60). Others stated that policies were “prejudiced”, as stated above in 
Guatemala’s comments on Ecuador’s proposals, or that signposting high 
levels of specific ingredients “demonized” or “stigmatized” certain 
products, as argued by the US in their comments on Thailand and Chile’s 
nutrition labelling policy proposals (G/TBT/M/45; G/TBT/M/61). 
Third, WTO members emphasized the potential harms and costs of 
the measures economically, invoking neoliberal beliefs that state inter-
vention prevents efficient market functioning. Note that such arguments 
go beyond the scope of the TBT Agreement, which calls for avoidance of 
unnecessary trade barriers and costs specifically, rather than wider 
economic costs. For example, in 2014 an EU official stated that Ecua-
dor’s labelling proposals were not “the best way … [to] foster effective 
competition” (G/TBT/M/64). And, in 2015, a US official argued that 
Peru’s labelling proposals would “stifle industry innovation to make 
food healthier” (G/TBT/M/66). 
3.3. Re-defining goals to ensure congruence with neoliberal economic 
theory, values, and beliefs 
The arguments outlined above illustrate how WTO members mobi-
lised powerful neoliberal assumptions, values, and beliefs to comment 
on nutrition labelling policies. The above arguments were common to 
HIC and LMIC WTO members. However, there was a further distinct 
pattern in the way HICs made such statements: they went beyond 
affirming or contesting policy goals to re-defining or re-directing them in 
ways that rendered them congruent with neoliberal beliefs. 
In particular, on a number of occasions HIC members stated explic-
itly what they believed the goal of the policy should be. These sugges-
tions were consistently aligned with neoliberal economic theory and 
beliefs that the state is excessively authoritative and inefficient, and thus 
suggest a discursive attempt to actively shape policy in other countries 
towards a neoliberal approach. For example, in 2013, a US official 
questioned the authoritative design of Peru’s warning messages on food 
labels, arguing that “more neutral messaging” could be considered, 
rather than “instructing consumers not to consume particular products” 
via the proposed warning label (G/TBT/M/73). This discursive strategy 
was also evident in the reframing of policy objectives, where members 
referred to a policy goal using language that implied a different target 
for intervention compared with the original policy proposal submitted 
to the WTO. For example, an EU representative commented on Chile’s 
labelling scheme by stating that it doubted “if the approach was pro-
portional to the aim pursued, which was to empower consumers to make 
informed dietary choices in order to foster effective competition and 
consumer welfare” (G/TBT/M/59). Yet, Chile’s original policy proposal 
did not state that the policy aimed to foster effective competition and 
consumer welfare; instead the policy referred more specifically to the 
goal of warning populations about the nutrient profile of certain foods, 
reduce consumption of unhealthy foods, and address obesity and related 
non-communicable diseases (G/TBT/N/CHL/219). 
3.4. Setting policy norms and procedures by appealing to high-income 
members’ authority 
HIC WTO members further argued that other countries should follow 
policy norms and procedures they advocated for, rather than those 
specifically set out in WTO rules. For example, in 2013 an Australian 
representative questioned Indonesia’s labelling proposals by arguing 
that the government could consider alternative “measures to promote 
consumer health, which were being considered by other countries, 
including Australia” (G/TBT/M/63). At the same meeting a US official 
added that Chile could adopt measures similar to its own “proposed 
rules for nutrition labelling”. 
The US also called on countries to increase opportunities for stake-
holder input in policy development, outside the WTO. In the Chilean 
case, for example, the US “urged Chile” to open up its policy develop-
ment process to external input “and consult with all stakeholders in 
doing so” (G/TBT/M/66). This argument has similarities with an earlier 
informal challenge against Thailand’s proposed labelling measure in 
which the US “urged Thailand to discuss the labelling issue with the 
many stakeholders that had expressed concerns” with the regulations 
(G/TBT/M/43). 
Fig. 2. Network plot of challenges to interpretative Front-of-Pack (FOP) nutrition labelling policies, 2007–2019 at the WTO TBT Committee. Notes: Node colour 
corresponds to country income group in the year the member was first subject to or raised a challenge. Arrow thickness and circular node size correspond to the 
number of times a circular node raised challenges to nutrition labelling policies proposed by members denoted in square nodes; larger node sizes and thicker lines 
correspond to a larger frequency of challenges. See Appendix 5 for a summary of challenges by WTO member. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this 
figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.) 
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Note that both of the above arguments go beyond the rules and ob-
ligations set out in the TBT Agreement, which include a formal 
requirement to follow codified international standards where applicable 
– rather than any existing practices – and which do not explicitly require 
additional stakeholder input outside WTO (WTO 2015). Through the 
above statements, members instead appealed to their preferences, 
established norms, and the authority of their established policies to call 
for policies and processes to change. 
4. Discussion 
In this study we identified that TBT Committee discourse on inter-
pretative FOP nutrition labelling policies proposed by Thailand, Chile, 
Indonesia, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Uruguay, 2007–2019, featured a 
suite of non-technical frames, narratives, and normative claims. WTO 
members mobilised neoliberal assumptions and beliefs to champion 
individualized accounts of the causes of poor nutrition, sanction policies 
rooted in individual-level change, and contest the inefficiencies, harms, 
and injustices of members’ proposed regulations. These patterns of 
discourse were consistent across HICs and LMICs. HIC WTO members 
also re-framed LMIC members’ policy goals to focus on individual de-
terminants of poor nutrition and market-oriented interventions, again 
drawing on neoliberal assumptions through these statements. HIC WTO 
members further pressured other countries to adopt policy designs and 
processes aligned with those they had adopted or preferred. 
What do these patterns of discourse at the WTO imply for our un-
derstanding of the political processes that shape or subvert nutrition 
labelling policies, and the sources of power that are mobilised in this 
process? There is extensive evidence to suggest that frames, narratives, 
and normative appeals can have a strong influence on political agendas, 
priorities, and decisions, especially where they appeal to powerful ide-
ologies like neoliberalism, and are raised by economically powerful 
actors (Carstensen and Schmidt 2016; Chong and Druckman 2007; 
Kidwell et al. 2013). We identified a suite of such appeals that invoked 
neoliberal ideology to contest nutrition labelling proposals at the WTO. 
High-income members also used select non-technical claims to lobby for 
policy goals and designs they preferred. TBT discourse may therefore 
serve as an inconspicuous tool through which nutrition labelling policies 
in LMICs are shaped, weakened, or potentially subverted by powerful 
high-income WTO members, and by powerful neoliberal ideology. 
Neoliberal principles have certainly suffused the policy space more 
broadly and these TBT discussions may simply reflect this reality. 
However, TBT discussions may serve to further normalize and legitimate 
members’ neoliberal rhetoric and policy approaches. Furthermore, 
almost every country globally is now a member of the WTO, and those 
who observe concerns raised regarding other members’ measures in the 
TBT Committee are likely to take such comments into account when 
designing their own policies. Neoliberal discourse of the nature that 
features in TBT discussions serves more broadly to de-socialize the 
causes of poor nutrition and de-politicize the health issues it creates, as 
poor diet becomes a personal issue which individuals, rather than gov-
ernments, are expected to address (Carter 2015; Chaufan and Saliba 
2019; Sweet 2018). TBT discourse may therefore be influential in 
discouraging members from proposing structural interventions and 
alternatively encourage them to focus on individual-level determinants 
of poor diet, and/or to prioritize policies that entail relatively little 
mandatory state regulation. These possibilities are supported by evi-
dence showing that claims raised at the TBT Committee have previously 
been associated with changes in policy, including the scope of measures 
under consideration (Barlow et al., 2018; Wijkstrom and McDaniels 
2013). 
To be sure, the non-technical claims we identified accompanied 
technical-legal appeals to TBT rules, and TBT rules may shape the scope 
and content of non-technical discourse. For example, Members may 
contest the consistency of members’ labelling proposals with neoliberal 
economic theory (as we illustrate) because they consider such argu-
ments consistent with the ‘spirit’ of WTO rules: to reduce trade costs, 
promote trade and, ultimately, facilitate economic development. 
Furthermore, as Lencucha noted in their analysis of WTO disputes on 
tobacco, WTO members may make non-technical claims in order to try 
and bolster their technical-legal arguments and to give them meaning, 
that is, to make them resonate (Lencucha et al. 2016). As such, 
non-technical arguments may serve largely to help make 
technical-arguments regarding nutrition policies persuasive. These 
points underscore the importance of these non-technical arguments for 
understanding how WTO processes shape nutrition labelling policy. 
The discursive patterns we identify in our analysis also recall those 
championed by industry elsewhere, including in other trade fora (Friel 
Table 3 
TBT discourse: non-technical and normative arguments against nutrition labelling regulations.  
Discursive category Summary of discursive themes Relationship to ideological and/or material sources of power 
Neoliberal narratives: individualizing 
the causes of dietary diseases  
• Highlight individual causes including habits and lifestyles  
• Highlight the role of individual dietary context in 
determining the links between processed food consumption 
and disease  
• Question the harms from processed foods and ingredients  
• Question whether processed foods can be singled out as a 
cause of nutritional diseases and stress the role of self- 
regulation and moderation  
• Emphasize the positive nutritional qualities in certain foods 
and ingredients  
• Invokes dominant neoliberal values, assumptions and beliefs 
which individualize the causes of social problem and downplay 
the role of structural drivers (eg unhealthy food environments) 
Contesting and affirming congruence 
with neoliberal economic theory, 
values and beliefs  
• Support policies aimed oriented their goals towards 
improving individual choices or information  
• Stress the inequitable, inappropriate, malign, or otherwise 
harmful nature of policies targeting specific food products or 
product categories, including their social costs  
• Invokes dominant neoliberal values, assumptions and beliefs that 
champion individualized solutions to obesity and warn of the 
inefficiencies and injustices of state intervention 
Re-defining policy goals to ensure 
congruence with neoliberal economic 
theory, values, and beliefs  
• Re-articulate the policy’s goal(s) in ways that focus on 
individual choices, information, and attention to market 
competition  
• Argument raised exclusively by high-income members  
• Invokes dominant neoliberal values, assumptions and beliefs that 
champion individualized solutions to obesity and warns of the 
inefficiencies, dangers, and authoritative nature of state 
intervention 
Setting policy norms by appealing to 
high-income members’ authority  
• Cited established policies (or policy norms) in other 
(developed) countries as preferred examples of practice to 
follow  
• Call for engagement with stakeholders from their own 
governments  
• Argument raised exclusively by high-income members  
• Invokes materially wealthy country policies as source of 
authority 
Notes: See Appendix 2 for detailed codebook. 
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et al., 2016). For example, multi-national food corporations have 
repeatedly used their large marketing budgets to disseminate a narrative 
of obesity that highlights the causative role of individual choices in 
leading to poor diets and questions the harms from processed foods 
(Allen 2020). Studies have also shown that industry representatives 
have undermined nutrition policies by stressing the lost efficiencies 
resulting from mandatory industry regulations, and an unjust stigmati-
zation certain foods (Bes-Rastrollo et al., 2013; European Commission 
2006; Verduin et al. 2005). The similarities between industry discourse 
and the patterns in our data suggest that industry may be lobbying 
governments to perpetuate a discourse at the TBT that undermines the 
socio-political acceptability of the nutrition policies they contest, and 
legitimizes those they endorse. This possibility is bolstered by evidence 
showing that as multi-national food companies have expanded their 
market dominance in LMICs, including via investment and exports, they 
are increasingly engaged in lobbying efforts in LMICs to advance health 
policy agendas and decisions that serve their interests (Gómez 2019; 
Greenhalgh 2019). Indeed, lobbying may explain why some LMICs were 
regularly involved in TBT debates, especially Latin American countries 
which receive large inward investments in the processed food industry 
(e.g. Mexico) and are major exporters of ingredients like sugar used in 
snack food production (e.g. Brazil).1 Alternatively, industry may wield 
influence indirectly, by producing distorted scientific evidence and 
policy advice that is forcefully communicated to governments (Allen 
2020; Barlow et al., 2018), and subsequently referenced at the TBT 
Committee. 
It is nevertheless important to note that many of the discursive pat-
terns we identify reflect a neoliberal ideology that is powerful in its own 
right, albeit one that is supported by industry and upholds its interests 
(Cullerton et al., 2016). The alignment of TBT discourse with industry 
interests arguably reflects a more fundamental transformation in state 
policy in the post-war era, whereupon governments have embraced 
neoliberal ideology and policies that prioritize industry interests over 
health (Lencucha and Thow 2019). Furthermore, we found that 
neoliberal appeals were articulated by LMICs who were not the historic 
proponents of neoliberalism and may even experience economic and 
health harms due to its dominance (Babb and Kentikelenis 2017; 
Thomson et al. 2017). These considerations point to a further way in 
which power features in TBT discussions: implicit references to neolib-
eralism may reflect its dominance as an ideology that sub-consciously 
structures patterns of discourse in both LMICs and HICs, serves the in-
terests of powerful groups, and furthers health disadvantages even 
among those who promote it. 
Our findings also have implications for scholarship on trade policy 
and health. Researchers in the field have long argued that trade rules 
and agreements can be used to delay health policies and may even lead 
governments to abandon health policy proposals entirely, including 
those regulations targeting dietary improvements (Koivusalo et al. 2009; 
Thow et al., 2017). We identified a suite of non-technical claims that 
accompany appeals to TBT rules and associated informal challenges. 
This builds on previous findings elsewhere, which demonstrated how 
ideological discourse is used by powerful non-state actors to try and 
influence trade agendas and to shape the outcome of WTO discussions 
on tobacco (Lencucha et al. 2016; Townsend et al., 2019). Given that 
discourse can be highly influential in shaping political attitudes and 
behaviour, these patterns of discourse may hold even greater sway than 
technical arguments based on TBT rules. Taken together, these findings 
call attention to the importance of the non-technical, discursive, and 
ideological pathways through which government officials use the WTO 
to shape domestic nutrition policy, and how these pathways create scope 
for the subtle mobilisation of power to exert political pressure. 
This study also provides insights for the public health community 
regarding responses to informal trade challenges. There have typically 
been two policy conclusions arising from studies assessing how TBT 
rules are used to contest nutrition policies: regulations should be 
designed so that they conform to technical obligations required in the 
TBT Agreement to reduce the possibility of an informal challenge, and 
TBT rules and other trade obligations should to be enforced and 
designed in ways that provide adequate scope for effective nutrition 
policy implementation (Mitchell and Voon 2011; Thow et al., 2017). 
However, by revealing the non-technical claims that are invoked to 
informally challenge nutrition labelling policies at the TBT Committee, 
our study highlights that technical fixes to the global trade regime or 
policy design may be inadequate, especially where WTO members are 
supportive of neoliberal ideas and hence easily persuaded by WTO 
discourse. In order to effectively address discursive pressure at WTO, it 
will likely be necessary to develop powerful counter-discourses that 
engage with and effectively contest the powerful frames, discourse, and 
ideologies that are invoked at the TBT Committee – and the vested in-
terests they represent. Strategies that may be effective in this regard 
include the alignment of nutrition labelling proposals with neoliberal 
rhetoric, for example by citing the economic costs and inefficiencies 
from delaying regulation (Bloom et al., 2011). Alternatively, it may be 
relatively effective to appeal to principles of social justice, for example 
by citing society’s obligation to ensure equal opportunities for living 
healthy lives, particularly among the worst-off (Braveman et al., 2011). 
4.1. Limitations 
This study presents a qualitative discourse analysis, drawing on 
publicly available meeting minutes. We have attempted to limit poten-
tial bias and enhance the transparency, reliability, and validity of our 
research by documenting our methods, incorporating checks into our 
coding process, acknowledging our subjectivity, and providing replica-
tion materials (Mays and Pope 2000). There are nevertheless several 
important limitations to note. First, summaries of TBT discussions in 
minutes may not convey the full details of informal challenges. Second, 
our analysis captures discussions that take place at the TBT Committee, 
and members may participate in parallel discussions elsewhere. Whilst 
these discussions may feature different issues and arguments, our 
analysis may provide an insight into what is said elsewhere, including 
discussions considering obligations in the many recent trade agreements 
which incorporated and expanded on WTO rules (Dür et al. 2014). 
Third, we could not directly investigate industry influence. 
Finally, our study did not assess the impact of discourse, although a 
large body of experimental research indicates significant effects of 
framing and discourse on political attitudes and behaviour (Chong and 
Druckman 2007). These limitations point to important areas for future 
research, including studies to assess whether TBT discourse shapes 
policy, and the use of the TBT committee as a corporate political strategy 
to undermine effective health policies. 
5. Conclusions 
In this study, we found that TBT Committee discourse on interpre-
tative FOP nutrition labelling policies proposed by 7 LMICs, 2007–2019, 
1 For example, Brazil was involved in several challenges and is the world’s 
largest exporter of sugar and the largest recipient of FDI in the food and 
beverage sector in Latin America (OECD 2019); Mexico raised several chal-
lenges has been ranked the 4th largest recipient of investment in food pro-
cessing globally; Guatemala was repeatedly involved in raising challenges, and 
FDI from the Central American Bottling Corporation, in which PepsiCo holds 18 
percent of ownership, accounts for 100% of Guatemala’s FDI in the food and 
beverage sector from other Latin American Countries (LAC) (Fiedler and Iafrate 
2016). This is significant because intra-LAC FDI accounts for almost 50% total 
FDI in LAC – albeit often from MNCs with branches in HICs. These patterns may 
explain why certain LMICs were raising challenges as MNCs providing inward 
investments may leverage the considerable economic power associated with 
investment by lobbying governments to raise challenges on their behalf – 
including against other LMICs – as has been identified in the case of tobacco 
(Eckhardt et al. 2016). 
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featured a suite of non-technical frames, narratives, and normative 
claims. WTO members mobilised neoliberal assumptions and beliefs by 
championing individualized accounts of the causes of poor nutrition, 
sanctioning policies rooted in individual-level change, and challenging 
the inefficiencies, harms, and injustices of members’ proposed regula-
tions. HIC WTO members further re-framed LMIC members’ policy goals 
to focus on individual determinants of poor nutrition and market- 
oriented interventions, and used non-technical claims to pressure 
other countries to adopt policy designs and processes they preferred. 
Patterns of TBT discourse also had striking similarities with arguments 
raised by multi-national food corporations elsewhere. Our findings 
suggest that non-technical and ideological claims in intercountry 
discourse within TBT meetings serve as inconspicuous tools through 
which nutrition labelling policies in LMICs are undermined by HICs, 
industry, and the powerful ideology of neoliberalism. 
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